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Abstract—Random frequency diverse array (RFDA) based di-
rectional modulation (DM) was proposed as a promising technol-
ogy in secure communications to achieve a precise transmission
of confidential messages, and artificial noise (AN) was considered
as an important helper in RFDA-DM. Compared with previous
works that only focus on the spot of the desired receiver, in
this work, we investigate a secrecy region around the desired
receiver, that is, a specific range and angle resolution around the
desired receiver. Firstly, the minimum number of antennas and
the bandwidth needed to achieve a secrecy region are derived.
Moreover, based on the lower bound of the secrecy capacity in
RFDA-DM-AN scheme, we investigate the performance impact
of AN on the secrecy capacity. From this work, we conclude
that: 1) AN is not always beneficial to the secure transmission.
Specifically, when the number of antennas is sufficiently large
and the transmit power is smaller than a specified value, AN
will reduce secrecy capacity due to the consumption of limited
transmit power. 2) Increasing bandwidth will enlarge the set for
randomly allocating frequencies and thus lead to a higher secrecy
capacity. 3) The minimum number of antennas increases as the
predefined secrecy transmission rate increases.
Index Terms—Directional Modulation, physical layer security,
random frequency diverse array, secrecy region.
I. INTRODUCTION
As the fifth-generation (5G) wireless networks coming to
reality, people and organizations become more dependent on
wireless devices to share secure and private information (e.g.,
location, wireless payment, e-health). Compared with wired
communication, wireless communication facilitates great con-
venience for people’s life in accompany with some secure
issues that should not be ignored. The broadcasting nature
of wireless communication system may lead to the leakage
of confidential information, which is undesirable to preserve
security and allows any unauthorized receiver to eavesdrop on
the wireless communications. As a complement to high-layer
encryption techniques, physical layer security has been widely
recognized as a promising way to enhance wireless security
by exploiting the characteristics of wireless channels [1]–[3].
In recent years, there has been a growing research inter-
est on directional modulation (DM), which is an approach
launched on multiple-antennas enabled physical layer secu-
rity technology. It remains the original constellation of the
confidential messages at the desired direction while distort
the constellation of that at the other directions [4]–[8]. In
the existing methods of the literatures, most of the works
employed the phased array (PA) to achieve DM scheme. The
aforementioned works studied DM under the assumption that
the potential eavesdropper locates at different direction from
desired user. However, the potential eavesdropper may be
passive and never transmit messages, whose location is not
available at the transmitter. Against this background, frequency
diverse array (FDA) aided DM scheme was proposed to realize
the secure transmission in the more practical scenarios where
the legitimate user and eavesdropper may locate in the same
direction but with different ranges from the transmitter. To
maximize the secrecy capacity, various of algorithms were
proposed [9]–[12]. The authors in [9] proposed random fre-
quency diverse array (RFDA) based DM scheme with the
aid of artificial noise (AN) to achieve two dimensions (i.e.,
angle and range) secure transmission, based on which the
orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM) and the
random subcarrier selection were adopted to further enhance
the performance of the secure transmissions [10], [11]. The
weighted fractional Fourier transform (WFRFT) with FDA
technology was employed to achieve power-efficient multi-
beam DM transmissions [12].
However, these works only focus on the secrecy trans-
mission to the spot of the desired receiver. Generally, the
eavesdropper may exist anywhere, a secrecy region is more
reasonable and useful than just considering one spot. That
is, an area around the desired receiver should be guaranteed
safety. For convenient, we named the DM-aided scheme with
AN as RFDA-DM-AN and one without AN as RFDA-DM in
this work. In this work, our main contributions are summarized
below.
• We first provide beampattern with ellipse function at the
desired user. Then, we derived the closed-form expres-
sions of lower bounds on the secrecy capacities of the
RFDA-DM-AN scheme and RFDA-DM scheme.
• The requirements of system resource (i.e., the minimum
number of antennas and the bandwidth for random fre-
quency mapping) to establish a secrecy region is investi-
gated.
• Through numerical studies we show the RFDA-DM
scheme outperforms the RFDA-DM-AN scheme when
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Fig. 1. A random frequency diverse array assisted secure communication
system
the number of antennas is sufficiently large and transmit
power is smaller than a specified value. Our conducted
analysis enabled transmitter to switch between these two
schemes to achieve the maximum secrecy capacity.
The rest of this work is organized as follows. Section II
presents a system model and constructs the RFDA aided DM
scheme. In section III, the expression of secrecy region around
the desired user is derived and the influence of the minimum
number of antennas at transmitter and the bandwidth allocated
for random frequency mapping on the safety performance of
the proposed scheme are examined. Finally, the numerical
illustrations are given in Section IV, and conclusions are drawn
in the last section.
Notation: Scalars are denoted by italic letters, vectors and
matrices are denoted by bold-face lower-case and uppercase
letters, respectively. Given a complex vector or matrix, (·)T ,
(·)H , tr(·), and ‖·‖ denote the transpose, conjugate transpose,
trace, and norm, respectively. IM represents identity matrix
with size M×M and the M×M all-one matrix is referred to
as EM .
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Considered Scenario and Adopted Assumptions
As shown in Fig. 1, this work considers a DM-based secure
communications network that transmitter Alice wants to send
the confidential messages to the desired user Bob, while the
potential eavesdropper Eve may exist around Bob and intends
to intercept the confidential messages. The transmitter Alice
is assumed to adopt the RFDA equipped with an M -element
antenna array, while all other nodes have a single antenna.
The transmitter is assumed to be located at the origin, and the
location of receiver denoted by (r, θ). Moreover, d denotes
the element spacing at the transmitter.
Different from the traditional phased array system, the
radiation frequency of the m-th element of RFDA is given
by
fm = f0 + km∆f, m = 1, 2, ...,M (1)
where f0 is the central carrier frequency, ∆f is the frequency
increment, and km is an independent identically distributed
(i.i.d.) random variables. Different distributions of km lead to
different frequency mapping rules used to allocate the carrier
frequencies of different elements. In this work, we define a
vector k to discuss this problem more succinctly and generally
as follows:
k = [k1, k2, ..., kM ]
T . (2)
We defined K = kTk, of which the value has correlation to
the bandwidth allocated for frequency mapping [13]. As such,
the phase shift of m-th element is given by [9], [13]
Ωm(r, θ) ≈ −2pi
(
(m− 1)f0d cos θ
c
+ km∆f
r
c
)
, (3)
where c is the speed of light.
Following (3), we can obtain the normalized steering vector
of RFDA for a specific location (r, θ), which is given by
h(r, θ) =
1√
M
[
ejΩ1(r,θ), ejΩ2(r,θ), ..., ejΩM (r,θ)
]T
. (4)
In the following, the locations of Bob and the Eve are denoted
by (rB , θB) and (rE , θE), respectively.
B. Direction Modulation with AN
In this subsection, we first detail the transmissions from
Alice to Bob and from Alice to Eve. Then, the associated
signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) or signal-to-interference-plus-noise
ratio (SINR) is presented.
In DM system, to provide secure communication, AN is
generated at the transmitter to distort the signal received by
potential eavesdroppers. And hence, the transmitted signal can
be expressed as
xt =
√
δPtvs+
√
(1− δ)Ptw, (5)
where s is the symbol of transmitting confidential message
that chosen from the complex signal constellation with average
power E[|s|2] = 1, Pt is the transmit power of RFDA antennas,
δ is power allocation factor between the confidential signal and
AN, v is the steering vector for the confidential signal, w is
the artificial noise vector. According to [9], the expressions of
v and w are respectively given by
v = h(rB , θB), (6)
w =
(
IM − h(rB , θB)hH(rB , θB)
)
z
‖(IM − h(rB , θB)hH(rB , θB)) z‖ , (7)
where h(rB , θB) is the steering vector of the transmitter
to desired user, z consists of M i.i.d. circularly-symmetric
complex Gaussian random variables with zero-mean and unit-
variance, and w is in the null space vector of hH(rB , θB).
We have hH(rB, θB)w = 0.
According to (5), the received signal at the desired receiver
Bob is given by
y(rB , θB) = h
H(rB , θB)xt + nB
=
√
δPth
H(rB , θB)h(rB , θB)s
+
√
(1− δ)PthH(rB , θB)w + nB,
=
√
δPts+ nB. (8)
where nB denotes the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN)
at Bob nB ∼ CN
(
0, σ2B
)
. Hence, the SNR at Bob is given
by
(SNR)B =
δPt
σ2B
= δµ, (9)
where µ = Pt/σ
2
B .
The received signal at the eavesdropper Eve is given by
y(rE , θE) = h
H(rE , θE)xt + nE
=
√
δPth
H(rE , θE)h(rB , θB)s
+
√
(1− δ)PthH(rE , θE)w + nE , (10)
where nE ∼ CN
(
0, σ2E
)
is the AWGN at Eve.
Following (10), the SINR at Eve is given by
(SINR)E =
δPt
∣∣hH(rE , θE)h(rB , θB)∣∣2
(1− δ)Pt|hH(rE , θE)w|2 + σ2E
=
δµ
∣∣hH(rE , θE)h(rB , θB)∣∣2
(1− δ)µ|hH(rE , θE)w|2 + ε
, (11)
where ε = σ2E/σ
2
B .
III. ANALYSIS ON SECRECY PERFORMANCE
In this section, we consider the case where Bob has a
secrecy region in the angle and range dimensions. It is assumed
that Bob can discover the existence of the Eve immediately
once the potential eavesdropper appears in this area. To this
end, we introduce mathematical analysis to this system and
examine the factors that affect the system’s security perfor-
mance, based on which we can improve the performance. The
performance limits of such system is characterized in terms of
the secrecy capacity, which is given by
C = max {CB − CE , 0} , (12)
where CB and CE are Bob’s channel capacity and Eve’s
channel capacity, respectively.
A. Mathematical Analysis
We assume that Bob’s offset of the range and angle for
secrecy region is ∆r and ∆θ, respectively, i.e., the secrecy
region around Bob is set r˜B ∈ [rB − ∆r, rB + ∆r] ∩ θ˜B ∈
[θB − ∆θ, θB + ∆θ]. In this work, we consider the worst-
case scenario when Eve locates at the boundary of the secrecy
region. As such, maximum value of the correlation coefficients
between the four boundary positions and desired user Bob is
given by
β = max
{∣∣hH(rB ±∆r, θB ±∆θ)h(rB , θB)∣∣2} , (13)
thus means that the maximum power of confidential signal
that can be received by Eve is β when Eve is located on the
boundary of the secrecy region. Due to the random location
of Eve (outside the secrecy region), we have
∣∣hH(rE , θE)h(rB , θB)∣∣2 =
∣∣∣∣∣ 1M
M∑
m=1
ejzm
∣∣∣∣∣
2
, (14)
where
zm = pkm + q(m− 1), (15)
p = 2pi
∆f(rE − rB)
c
, (16)
q = 2pi
f0d(cos θE − cos θB)
c
. (17)
It should be noted that AN will not affect the power of
confidential signal received by Bob and Eve for a given power
allocation factor δ. Therefore, in order to achieve the secure
transmission, the power of confidential signal outside the se-
crecy region should be sufficiently small. i.e., the confidential
signal can be transmitted from Alice to Bob safely only
when
∣∣hH(rE , θE)h(rB , θB)∣∣2 ≤ β. We denote this necessary
condition as S.
Theorem 1: For the condition S, the minimum value of M
and K for having secure communication are given by
Mmin =
35.9◦c
√
1− β
∆θdf0 sin θB
, (18)
Kmin =
(
c
2pi∆f∆r
)2
(1− β)Mmin. (19)
Proof: Following (14) and the condition S, the transmit-
ting beampattern at Eve with the frequency increment vector
k is given by
G(rE , θE ,k) =
∣∣∣∣∣
M∑
m=1
ejzm
∣∣∣∣∣
2
≤ βM2. (20)
Using the second-order Taylor approximation, (20) can be
rewritten as
G(rE , θE ,k) =
M∑
m=1
M∑
n=1
[
1− 1
2
(zm − zn)2
]
≤ βM2. (21)
Substituting zm given in (15) into (21), we have
M∑
m=1
M∑
n=1
(zm − zn)2 = ρ1(k)p2 + 2ρ2(k)pq + Cq2
≥ 2(1− β)M2, (22)
where
ρ1(k) =
(
M∑
m=1
M∑
n=1
(km − kn)2
)
, (23)
ρ2(k) =
(
M∑
m=1
M∑
n=1
(km − kn) (m− n)
)
, (24)
C =
M∑
m=1
M∑
n=1
(m− n)
=
M2(M2 − 1)
6
. (25)
As discussed in [14], the value of vector k that translates
(22) into the general form of ellipse equivalently should be
the linear combination of eigenvectors corresponding to the
maximum eigenvalue of a matrix A, where A is given by
A =
1
3
M3
(
M2 − 1) IM − 2
3
M2
(
2M2 + 3M + 1
)
EM
− 4M2G+ 2M2(M + 1)P. (26)
where G and P represent a matrix of size M×M with value
of each element corresponding to the product and the sum of
row index m and column index n, respectively.
Then ρ1(k) and ρ2(k) can be further simplified as
ρ1(k) = 2MK, (27)
ρ2(k) = 0. (28)
Using (27) and (28), we obtain the ellipse function as
follows
(rE − rB)2
(∆r†)
2 +
(θE − θB)2
(∆θ†)
2 = 1, (29)
where ∆r† and ∆θ† are the solutions of (29), which are
respectively given by [14]
∆r† =
c
√
M(1− β)/K
2pi∆f
, (30)
∆θ† =
35.9◦c
√
1− β
Mdf0 sin θB
. (31)
Considering the potential eavesdropper is outside the secrecy
region, we have ∆r ≥ ∆r† and ∆θ ≥ ∆θ†. After some
algebraic manipulations, results in Theorem 1 is obtained.
B. Secrecy Performance
In the section II-B, we have discussed the SNR of Bob and
SINR of Eve in AN-aided DM scheme, based on which we
examine the security performance in this subsection.
First of all, we can get the channel capacity of Bob which
is given by
CB = log2 (1 + (SNR)B)
= log2(1 + δµ). (32)
Similarly, the channel capacity of Eve is given by
CE−AN = log2 (1 + (SINR)E)
= log2
(
1 +
δµ
∣∣hH(rE , θE)h(rB , θB)∣∣2
(1− δ)µ|hH(rE , θE)w|2 + ε
)
(b)
≤ log2
(
1 +
δµβ
(1− δ)µη(1 − β) + ε
)
, (33)
where (b) is achieved by using the condition S, and η is defined
as
η =
1
tr
{
[IM − h(rB , θB)hH(rB , θB)]2
} . (34)
Note that η can be easily obtained by the location of Bob (i.e.,
(rB , θB)), which is assumed to be available at the transmitter.
For the RFDA-DM-AN scheme, the secrecy capacity is
given by
CAN = CB − CE−AN (35)
≥ log2
(
1 + δµ
1 + δµβ(1−δ)µη(1−β)+ε
)
= CLBAN,
where CLBAN represents the lower bound of CAN.
To guarantee the transmission, i.e., CLBAN ≥ Rs, where Rs
is a predefined secrecy transmission rate, we have
β ≤ (1 − δ)µη + ε
(1 − δ)µη + δµ2Rs
1+δµ−2Rs
. (36)
Generally, the existing physical layer security techniques
can be classified into two categories in terms of the effects
on the eavesdropper. One is to reduce the information signal
leakage, and the other is to enlarge interference dynamics
through AN to disturb the received signal of eavesdropper. The
latter approach unavoidably consume additional energy (e.g.
for AN generation), and sacrifice the communication perfor-
mance at legitimate user. To tackle this issue, we consider the
DM scheme without AN in this part.
The DM without AN scheme (i.e., RFDA-DM scheme) is a
special case of the scheme mentioned in II-B, thus means that
the transmitting antenna will utilize all the transmit power to
transmit confidential signal (i.e., δ = 1). As such, the lower
bound of the secrecy capacity is given by
CLB = log2
(
1 + µ
1 + µβ
ε
)
. (37)
Likewise, (36) can be rewritten as
β ≤ (1 + µ− 2
Rs)ε
µ2Rs
. (38)
The analysis for the upper bound of β in (36) and (38)
enables us to determine the minimum values of M and K in
(18) and (19), respectively.
TABLE I
FREQUENCY INCREMENTS FOR EACH ELEMENTS OF ANTENNA ARRAY IN FIG. 3
m 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
K=10405
Frequency Increment:
km∆f (MHz)
-15.2 7.4 -36 32.5 18.5 33.8 -29.4 4.5 13.7 17.4 -56.2 -17.8 9.73 17.8 -22.9 22.2
K=12905 -16.9 8.2 -40.1 36.2 20.6 37.7 -32.8 5 15.3 19.4 -62.6 -19.8 10.8 19.8 -25.5 24.7
K=15405 -18.5 8.96 -43.8 39.5 22.5 41.2 -35.8 5.47 16.7 21.2 -68.4 -21.6 11.8 21.7 -27.9 27
15 20 25 30
Pt (dBm)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Se
cr
ec
y 
Ca
pa
ci
ty
 (b
it/s
/H
z)
        RFDA-DM-AN
        RFDA-DM
M=15
M=256
M=32
Fig. 2. Secrecy capacity versus the transmit power Pt under different values
of M .
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we use numerical simulation experiments
to evaluate the performance of our proposed system. Without
other statements, some main parameters used in this section
are set as follows. The carrier frequency f0 is set to 1 GHz
(i.e., f0 = 1 GHz), the frequency increment is set to 1 MHz
(i.e., ∆f = 1 MHz), the element spacing is half of the
wavelength (i.e., d = c/2f0), the location of desired user is
set at (100m, 45◦), ε = 1, and the noise variances of Bob and
Eve are set to 0 dBm (i.e., σ2B = σ
2
E = 0 dBm). The offsets
of angle and range offset are set as 5◦ and 8m, respectively
(i.e., ∆θ = 5◦,∆r = 8m). For the performance evaluation,
we assume that the Eve’s location is (108m, 40◦), which is
unknown to the transmitter. The power allocation factor is set
as δ = 0.6, thus means that 60% of the transmit power is
allocated to the confidential signal and the rest is allocated to
AN.
Fig. 2 plots the security capacity versus the transmit power
Pt under various values of M , where the minimum number
of transmit antennas obtained from (18), Mmin = 15.7 with
β = 0.4. In the Fig. 2, we can observe that secrecy capacity of
the RFDA-DM-AN scheme increases rapidly as Pt increases,
compared with RFDA-DM scheme, thus means that the secure
transmission from Alice to Bob becomes easier when Alice
allocate more transmit power to AN to enhance physical
layer security. When M = 15 < Mmin, RFDA-DM-AN
15 20 25 30
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Fig. 3. Secrecy capacity versus the transmit power Pt under different values
of K , where M = 16.
scheme completely outperforms RFDA-DM scheme, which
confirms the correctness of our Theorem 1. In addition, as M
becomes larger (e.g., M = 32, 256), we observe that RFDA-
DM scheme have a better performance than RFDA-DM-AN
scheme when Pt is smaller than a specified value, which is
due to the fact that Alice can construct a narrow beam towards
Bob when M is large enough to avoid information leakage to
Eve without the aid of AN when the transmit power is limited.
Fig. 3 depicts the security capacity versus the transmit
power Pt under different values of K for both RFDA-DM-AN
and RFDA-DM schemes. We recall that K is defined as K =
k
T
k, of which the value depends on the bandwidth allocated
for frequency mapping. Tab. I shows the frequency increments
for each elements of the antenna array, and we can find the
bandwidths for K = 10405, 12905, 15405 are approximately
equal to 90 MHz, 100 MHz, and 110 MHz, respectively. In
this figure, we observe that for both schemes security capacity
monotonically increases as K increases (equal increasing
bandwidth). This is because the increasing bandwidth will
enlarge the set for randomly allocating frequencies to improve
the resolution in range dimension.
Fig. 4 shows the effect of power allocation factor δ on the
secrecy performance of the RFDA-DM-AN scheme. In this
figure, we first observe that secrecy capacity first increases
and then decreases as δ increases when the transmit power Pt
is sufficiently large (i.e., Pt = 30 dBm), which indicates that
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Fig. 4. Secrecy capacity of the RFDA-DM-AN scheme versus the power
allocation factor δ under different values of M .
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Fig. 5. The minimum value ofM (i.e.,Mmin) versus the predefined secrecy
transmission rate Rs under different values of Pt.
there is an optimal value of δ that maximizes secrecy capacity.
The optimal value of δ will increase when the transmitter are
equipped with larger number of antennas, thus means that a
greater proportion of the transmit power is allocated to the
confidential signal in this case, which is due to the fact that
the large number of antennas rather than AN guarantees the
secure transmission.
In Fig. 5, we plot the minimum value of M (i.e., Mmin)
versus Rs under different values of the transmit power Pt.
From the figure, it can be observed that for both schemes
Mmin monotonically increases as Rs increases. It implies that
the transmitter requires a larger value of Mmin to compensate
the performance loss caused by the decrease of Pt. We also
note that Pt has greater impact onMmin of RFDA-DM scheme
than that of RFDA-DM-AN scheme for a given Rs.
V. CONCLUSION
This work examined secure communication with the aid of
DM and RFDA, in which Alice transmits confidential signal
to the desired user Bob, while Eve that may exist around
Bob tries to wiretap this confidential signal. We theoretically
analyzes the RFDA-DM and RFDA-DM-AN schemes with a
given secrecy region. The beampattern of the RFDA around
Bob can be translated into a ellipse function, based on which
the closed forms of the minimum value of M and K to
guarantee the secure communication and the secrecy capacities
in RRFDA-DM and RFDA-DM-AN schemes are obtained.
Numerical results have confirmed that the AN has a positive
performance impact when Pt is sufficiently large. Otherwise,
without AN is a better choice. Moreover, we found that
increasing the number of antennas could compensate the
performance loss caused by a small Pt or the absence of AN.
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